Arabic and Kurdish media outlets have circulated this news through video reports, highlighting a preliminary agreement reached between the transitional Syrian government’s Prime Minister Ahmad al-Shar' and the general commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces, Mazloum Abdi. In my perspective, I will analyze the points mentioned in the agreement regarding the political process, which claims to exclude no one with competencies among Syrians.

Let’s consider the first point:

"- Guaranteeing the rights of all Syrians in representation and participation in the political process and all state institutions based on competence, regardless of their religious or ethnic backgrounds."

This means that the first point seeks to inform us of the state's rejection of the principle of power-sharing based on ethnicity or sect, which would support the principle of citizenship.

The political environment in Syria is complicated, with interwoven contradictions that seem nearly impossible to resolve in a short period. Recently, massacres were committed against the Alawite community by factions of the National Army loyal to the Ankara government, brought in by public security to support them in confronting what are called remnants of the Syrian regime on the coast. This has led to the death of hundreds of public security personnel aligned with Ahmad al-Shar's government. The latter's response took a militia-like approach, resulting in the extermination of nearly 3,000 Alawite civilians, many of whom were mutilated before being killed and some thrown into the sea, according to local and international reports from institutions like the Washington Institute and European sources. In light of this, al-Shar found no option but to hasten discussions with Mazloum Abdi, agreeing to the pact to maintain his legitimacy in Damascus. Undoubtedly, we view this agreement as connected to a context of events that al-Shar’s government could not manage, nor could it control the militias that committed numerous massacres and violations against civilians. Many horrifying scenes of slaughter sparked shock and astonishment among people and the global public opinion. The news of this agreement seems to attempt to cover or distract from the predicament facing al-Shar and his government, and these massacres reinforced the opinion that there is significant sectarian and ethnic strife among Syrians, resulting from decades of sectarian and ethnic feeding that has led to a divisive reality among those communities. If Syria can be successfully imposed as a geographical and political unit, this does not imply that such unity exists as a psychological concept among the communities and peoples of Syria at all. Ignoring this truth represents a breakdown of any social contract imposed by force or by regional powers under the pretext of protecting their countries from division. The reality of these regimes and their societies remains one of division, suffering from congestion, tension, chaos, and awaiting some kind of external intervention that reveals its true state. The massacres against Alawites, and prior ones committed by Iranian sectarian militias and the Syrian regime against the Sunni community, represent a division that cannot be shaped into a social contract through a political law or a new system, leading to coexistence among these components that can now only kill one another. This indicates that the implementation of centralized governance in Syria is impossible due to the lack of trust between all Syrian components, which have become apprehensive of handing over their weapons to the state, fearing they will meet the same fate as the Alawite community, which was led to slaughter and destruction.

Thus, the timing of the agreement carries significant implications, including al-Shar's attempt to protect himself by seeking help from Mazloum Abdi, with the agreement leading to reduced international pressure on him. This means he could quickly renege on the agreement if those pressures lifted and Turkey extended a hand to him, relieving him of any commitment that might lead to Kurdish demands for a federal system akin to that in South Kurdistan.

Consequently, it appears that this agreement, in its entirety, serves as a means to escape a circumstantial predicament rather than a genuine intention for a solution, stability, and sustainable appeasement.

The Second Point:

"The Kurdish community is an integral part of the Syrian state, and the Syrian state guarantees its rights in citizenship and all its constitutional rights."

Legally, this point and according to the constitution and political customs carry multiple dimensions and contexts, and therefore the definition of national identity within the Syrian state must be clarified. Here, "community" refers to a human group residing within a political entity, which does not grant it any legal status like the right to self-determination. Instead, the Kurds are viewed similarly to a religious sect or minority comprising a few hundred people, while their actual number exceeds 3 million, not counting those living in various Syrian cities like Aleppo, Damascus, Latakia, Idlib, Hama, and others.

The term "Kurdish people" has been replaced with "Kurdish community" in an effort to negate their national character, keeping them within the Syrian state as an indivisible unit. This suggests that the Syrian constitution will not recognize Kurds .

Reber Habun