Since the beginning of the Syrian uprising, the issue of political decentralization and federalism has remained an active, objective option. It is not an incidental idea to the political scene; rather, it emerges today from the geography, history, and ethnoreligious diversity that distinguish Syria from many other regional countries. In Western Kurdistan, where Kurdish, Arab, Alawite, Druze, Syriac, Armenian, and other identities intertwine, federalism appears as a solution that protects this diversity from being forcibly merged into a rigid central state, which still carries within its structure the exclusionary Ba’ath ideology, or perhaps the ugliest aspects of it. It is noteworthy that the Holy Qur'an affirms the principle of Shura (“And consult them in affairs”—Surah Ash-Shura: 38), urging broader participation in decision-making beyond narrow centers.  

Additionally, the prophetic Sunnah demonstrates that the Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) delegated authority to governors of cities, granting them room for Ijtihad (independent reasoning). Later, during the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, scholars distinguished between “general authority” (caliphate or imamate) and “special authority” (governance of a region or province), permitting extensive delegation in the latter.  

This discourse is consistent with the experiences of multiple modern peoples and nations. For example, Catalonia in Spain, the Basque Country, Scotland in the United Kingdom, and even Quebec in Canada serve as varied models of how national identity can coexist with state unity through flexible or federative governance systems.  

The Kurdish experience in Syria now reflects a struggle between two visions: one sees federalism as an inclusive framework to ensure Syria’s unity through recognizing the rights of its diverse components; the other perceives any form of self-governance as a threat to state unity, ignoring that history is replete with examples of states collapsing due to repression and denial rather than recognizing diversity. The Kurdistan experience in Iraq illustrates a closer analogy to the Syrian Kurdish imagination, showing that political decentralization can become a guarantee of stability if coupled with genuine political will, but it may turn into a contested arena if reduced to power-sharing among rival elites.  

The Syrian context is intertwined with these lessons. The Syrian revolution today reveals the fragility of the national fabric shaped by the erstwhile regime over decades—an experience not so different from that of the transitional government, which clings to centralization and claims, as the slogans of “national unity” are put to the test. Many parties, regional and internal, exhibit tendencies of monopolization and dominance. Without a unifying vision, the Kurds find themselves facing two bitter choices: return to Baathist centralism or pursue a decentralized political project—though the latter, often accused of separatism, is fundamentally opposite to it.  

This state of affairs overlaps with other nations’ experiences. Scotland in 2014 held a legally sanctioned, democratic independence referendum but remains part of the UK. Conversely, Catalonia in 2017 faced severe repression after a referendum for independence, which reawakened tensions and diminished chances for dialogue. The lesson here is clear: wise handling of self-governance demands strengthens a state’s unity, whereas exclusion and repression pave the way for fragmentation.  

In this context, the current Kurdish discourse in Syria faces a smear campaign, led by centralist forces supported by regional media outlets, depicting federalism as a pathway to division. In reality, federalism fundamentally aims to distribute power and resources equitably among components—especially Kurdish forces—rather than unifying their rhetoric. In the past, internal conflicts fueled by external interventions weakened their negotiating position with opposition forces and influenced negotiations with the Syrian transitional government. This has allowed opponents to portray division as a sign of the project’s immaturity.  

Global experiences demonstrate that the success of federalism depends not only on constitutional texts but also on a political culture capable of managing pluralism. For example, in Canada, democratic institutions contain separatist tendencies in Quebec through linguistic, cultural, and economic policies respecting local specificity. Despite remarkable economic success, Iraq’s Kurdish factions still face internal disagreements and unresolved central government hesitations in Baghdad, which hamper the full achievement of their autonomous model—though it has protected the region from the chaos sweeping the rest of Iraq since 2003.  

In the Syrian context, federalism—particularly for the Kurdish population and other diverse communities—is not a utopian dream but a political and historical necessity to ensure peaceful coexistence within a multi-identity state. Achieving it requires a strategic awareness that transcends current momentary interests, along with a cohesive vision assuring both internal and external audiences that it is not a project of division but a framework for rebuilding Syria based on justice and participation. Drawing from national experiences, what some see as a threat to unity might, in fact, be the only guarantee for its survival.  

Dr. Mahmoud Abbas