1- Introduction:
Today, after nearly five months since the fall of the Assad dictatorship, which had oppressed Syrians for more than 54 years, debate, concern, and fear continue to surround the future shape of the Syrian state. The discussion often intensifies between the secular camp, which calls for a secular state, and the religious camp, which advocates for a religious state. Often, these discussions turn into heated verbal battles, with each side attempting to demonize the other and elevate itself.

It is undeniable that the intensity of these debates and fears about Syria's future are largely linked to the current authority’s Islamic nature—those who took power after the fall of the former regime. Although they have not declared their intention to establish a religious state, they also have not explicitly or clearly committed to democracy. Democracy has been absent from their national dialogue conferences and constitutional declarations. Moreover, the declaration itself granted the head of this authority almost absolute powers. Other measures and practices taken by this authority also contradict or significantly oppose democratic principles. This complex situation has made the future of Syria highly uncertain and troubling, increasing tensions among the public.

In such a charged atmosphere, where the gap between the secular and Islamic factions appears vast, and the feasibility of applying either extreme is clearly impossible given the strong support for each side, it becomes essential to seek a middle ground—a compromise acceptable to both sides, positioned at the farthest ends of the current spectrum of influential forces inside Syria.

This realistic solution lies in what we call "the civil state," more precisely, "the democratic civil state." This message is addressed generally to all Syrians but primarily to the two conflicting sides—supporters of a secular state and supporters of a religious state. The democratic civil state can serve, now and in the foreseeable future, as a common ground for both parties and others. It is not merely a compromise—something we will revisit later.

2- Why is the religious state unfit for Syria?
Syria is a pluralistic society. When governed religiously, it is typically ruled by one of its sects, usually the largest sect, according to its sharia law. This leads to a sectarian system, dividing people into rulers and ruled based on religious sects. This creates a sense of injustice and inequality among the oppressed sects in their homeland, who may feel governed by another sect imposing its laws on them. Such a state, in their view, would be the state of the ruling sect, justified only by their numerical superiority. This does not make their rule legitimate but rather a tyranny of the majority or dominance, purely based on numerical strength. For them, this state would be an alien oppressor, fueling sectarian tension and resentment and preventing stability, ultimately risking conflicts that could divide the country.

In short, a sectarian religious state in Syria spells disaster—a catastrophe from which the country will not escape this time.

3- Why is the secular state unsuitable in Syria?
Secularism in any country fails when it is an imported recipe from abroad—this remains largely true today in Syrian society, which is still far from the social and cultural development necessary for a secular state. Large segments of the general population, not necessarily from a single sect, harbor deeply rooted rejection of secularism. One of the main reasons is their ignorance of secularism and its misconception as hostility toward religion and moral decadence—a misconception that requires tremendous effort to correct.

Furthermore, a large part of the Sunni Arab majority in Syrian society is currently experiencing religious extremism. These groups desire a religious state and would outright refuse a secular one. It would also be very difficult today to reach an agreement with them even on a civil state!

Additionally, most advocates of secularism are mainly from religious and ethnic minorities, who constitute about 40% of Syria’s population (Kurds, Christians, Alawites, Druze, Ismailis, and others). But most of these minorities do not want secularism for its own sake; rather, they see it as an alternative to a religious sectarian majority state they oppose, whether strict or lenient. 

Most advocates of secularism today want it as a rejection of a sectarian majority state—not out of love for secularism itself. Many are not willing to meet the requirements or implications of secular governance. If secular principles are presented to them with concessions to their demands that oppose or violate secular principles, then secularism will cease to be truly secular.

For example, if we ask a random sample of secular advocates whether they accept equality in inheritance among sons and daughters—which is not the most critical issue—they would largely reject it, revealing how far they are from true secular principles.

In conclusion, it is safe to say that any elite advocating for a secular state today is dreaming. The internal and external conditions needed to establish a genuinely secular system in Syria are largely lacking. 

Therefore, the only viable option remains the "civil state." So, what is the "civil state"?