At first glance, Presidential Decree No. (66), issued by the head of the transitional phase "Ammar al-Shaar," concerning the formation of the "Supreme Committee for Parliamentary Elections," appears as an organizational step within the context of the political transition. It might be viewed as a positive initiative toward building new institutions. However, the details of its composition and the proposed mechanisms of operation raise legitimate questions about the seriousness of this transformation, and whether it opens the door for genuine change or simply reorders the scene to maintain the core of the political structure without any fundamental modifications.

The committee comprises 11 members, a significant number of whom belong to the former "National Coalition," a political entity that played a prominent role in a previous era but faced considerable challenges in representing popular sentiment over recent years. The parliament to be elected will consist of 150 seats, one-third of which are appointed by presidential decision, while the remaining two-thirds are elected through mechanisms not yet fully clarified, relying on so-called "elites and intellectuals," without precise criteria defining this classification.

This structure raises a number of fundamental issues:

1. Recycled Elites

Most of the committee members are former members of the "National Coalition." Some may see this as a continuation of previous expertise, but it also raises concerns if it is not accompanied by critical reviews of these elites' performance. The return of figures from traditional opposition circles to a transitional authority position this time prompts questions about their capacity to overcome past failures and meet the aspirations of Syrians who demand profound change.

In this context, the "cycle of elites" theory by sociologist Vilfredo Pareto, which states that elites do not disappear but instead reposition themselves within the institutions of each emerging authority, is relevant.

2. Apparent Diversity... Formal Pluralism Is Not Enough

The composition seemingly reflects some diversity, including representatives of women and religious and ethnic minorities (Kurds, Turkmen, Christians), which is noteworthy from a formal perspective. However, according to Levinshy and Wai's analysis in their study on "Hybrid Regimes," such superficial pluralism may transform into a decorative tool used by authorities to present a democratic facade before the international community without genuine substance.

This concern is reinforced by the clear absence of representatives from central provinces such as Suwayda, which appears as a form of punishment or exclusion, especially since it has become a hub for civil activism in recent years and has borne the consequences of the conflict between the center and local factions. Similarly, the province of Latakia faces double marginalization despite its historical significance in the political landscape, amid ongoing waves of sectarian violence.

3. The Dilemma of "Elites and Intelligentsia"... Who Are These in the Syrian Context?

The terms used to describe the mechanisms of representation lack clarity. Who truly is the "Syrian intellectual"? Is it the free writer, or the media figure close to decision circles? And who is the "Ayn" (representative)? Is it a tribal sheikh, a local official, an economic actor? Or is it the "organic intellectual" as Gramsci describes, connected to the people's issues and their immediate interests?

The absence of clear definitions for these concepts opens the door to their flexible and potentially problematic use, which may lead to indirect exclusion. In this way, the criteria for selection become more of selective tools than transparent standards, and the danger lies in the monopolization of symbolic representation by narrow circles under broad and vague labels.

4. Electoral Engineering That Drains the Transition of Its Meaning

The proposed mechanism for forming the parliament suffers from clear gaps in transparency and accountability:
- The electorate is indirectly constituted, weakening the principle that "the people are the source of legitimacy."
- One-third of the members are appointed by presidential decision, undermining their independence.
- There is no clear timeline for elections or for the committee’s work, leaving open the possibility of perpetuating provisional institutions.

5. The Absence of Oversight Powers = A Formal Recreational

As for the "People's Council" itself—whose name perhaps should have been changed to break the intrinsic link with the Ba’ath era— it does not seem to have real powers derived from the "people." According to the constitutional declaration, the council has ceremonial powers such as proposing laws and approving the budget, without actual oversight tools over the president or the government.

This aligns with economist Douglas North’s description of "false institutions," which appear to serve the public interest but in practice entrench elite privileges and disable accountability mechanisms.

Even if the council is fully formed and begins functioning, it remains without real oversight or accountability tools. It has no authority over the president or government, making its existence akin to a "constitutional decoration"—internally to showcase diversity and externally to provide a potential institutional cover for future international agreements on "institutionalizing transitional governance."

Finally...

Our greatest fear is reaching the "People’s Council" without the people, with elites and a number of "organic intellectuals" — as our Uncle Gramsci called them — without this council having the ability or the desire to bring about the change worthy of the sacrifices made by the Syrians.

 Dr.Ghenwa Al Shoumari