After the fall of the regime on December 8, 2024, the al-Julani forces came to replace it, declaring the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad's rule. He subsequently declared himself the transitional president for a period of three months, and as March approached, having completed the three months, he announced a constitutional text for the new Syria that extends the presidential term to five years.

This means that he replaced Bashar al-Assad without elections and without consensus from other factions, discarding the popular referendum and national consensus. Thus, he legitimized his presence through formal procedures covered by Turkish intelligence and individual decisions that counter the popular will and the institutions that should be managed democratically. However, the jihadist Islamist mentality understands only how to seize power and monopolize it, and it can be said that al-Julani and the group of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham have seized Damascus and declared themselves the new Syrian government, reminiscent of the coup by Hafez al-Assad and the series of coups that preceded it.

Today, al-Julani uses a jihadist rhetoric that often reminds us of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s sermons from the pulpits of Mosul and Raqqa. We observe a surge of foreign Islamic groups coming from Turkestan, Chechnya, the Uyghurs, and their nearby regions, as if they declared themselves a fortress and a protective wall around al-Julani and his government, as if they had come for pilgrimage. The visit of the Turkish Foreign Minister, the intelligence chief, and the Turkish Minister of Economy to bless al-Julani as the president for another transitional period is evidence of the substantial coordination between Turkey and this government, confirming that it operates according to Turkish interests with extreme precision. Undoubtedly, this single-colored, jihadist government relies on the logic of empowerment as the foundation of its existence and dominance, according to its literature, indicating the continuation of exclusion and repression. What will be the stance of the international community towards it? History seems to be repeating itself in a worse form, leading us to the conclusion that stability or a political solution, given these conditions, is far-fetched. This, in turn, opens the door to a new cycle of violence and struggle for power.

What I initially expect is that the West and the United States will not recognize this government and its jihadist rhetoric, and they will reconsider lifting sanctions. We may witness economic sanctions and political pressures to contain this terrorist entity, especially since Israel, from the summit of Mount Hermon, is monitoring what is happening and threatening intervention if necessary, as it cannot feel safe from a government hostile to it and close to its borders, akin to the Taliban currently governing Afghanistan.

Regarding Iran and Russia, they will see this as a direct threat to them, as Iran is expected to mobilize its sectarian factions in the name of protecting the Alawites from systematic massacres, making its way from the Syrian al-Bukamal to the coast to confront al-Julani’s terrorist groups. Furthermore, civilians from the coastal areas who have sought refuge at the Russian Hmeimim base for protection have put Russia in a position where it must take action that weakens the new government. Arab states such as Egypt and the UAE will not accept what is happening in Syria and will act according to their interests. As for the United Nations, it will issue, as usual, a statement condemning what is happening, and it will not be able to take further action without the consensus of the major powers involved in the Syrian issue.

This situation leads us to a point that stability is far from achievable in light of an exclusionary, extremist project. Turkey wishes to use these groups as leverage against the West and Russia if the West continues to use the Kurdish card and maintains its drawing of a Middle East map that threatens Turkey as an extremist national state.

However, relying on Israeli military intervention is unrealistic, as it will intervene in a limited manner through airstrikes on ideologically linked sites to Hamas, as it did by striking the headquarters of a leader of the Islamic Jihad Movement. Iran will move Iraqi Shiite militias to cross into Syria towards coastal areas, while Turkey will continue its usual game of contradictions, using al-Julani as a leverage tool, keeping him under its surveillance in such a way as not to allow him to gain strength, and it will revert to its tactics of blackmailing the West and the United States, trading the issue of al-Julani for its demands regarding stopping support for the Syrian Democratic Forces and ending the autonomous administration in northeastern Syria. The administration will seek to establish channels of communication with Egypt and the UAE to gain either financial or media support, all indicating that Syria is heading towards the unknown.

The upcoming phase is marked by the return of sectarian jihadist militia conflicts to Syria, with Turkey as the main player in the region.

Reber Haboan