This phased American move, which President Donald Trump expressed in his promise to the Syrians to lift sanctions, is a means to contain the enemy (Jolani’s government, "Ammar al-Shur") as long as its presence prevents Iran and Russia from returning to the region. The U.S. previously supported Al-Qaeda against the Soviet Union; lifting sanctions would enhance America’s influence in Syria. Moreover, the current government in Damascus is essentially dependent on its willingness to implement what Israel desires in the region. The more it agrees to normalization and joins the Abraham Accords, the more legitimacy it gains. Opening diplomatic channels would enable this government to benefit from opportunities to lift restrictions on financial transfers, aviation, and trade.

Trump’s America has an underlying strategy related to countering Turkish, Chinese, and Russian influence. When sanctions are lifted, the U.S. recognizes that it is politically cooperating with its allies and contributing to reconstruction efforts. 

Let’s turn to Trump’s praise of Mr. Ahmad al-Shara, previously known as Al-Jolani, and consider similar historical examples—many in number. For instance, the U.S. praised Saddam Hussein’s actions during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and provided him with intelligence for eight years. Later, in 2003, the U.S. turned against him and executed him.

The invasion of Iraq was justified by the alleged possession of weapons of mass destruction. Additionally, Osama bin Laden was trained during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and later became America’s main enemy following the September 11, 2001 attacks. 

Similarly, Gaddafi abandoned his pursuit of nuclear weapons in 2003, which was viewed by the U.S. as a sign of alliance, only to be overthrown in 2011, ending his life on the hands of NATO-supported rebels. The U.S. also supported Taliban against the Soviet Union and later negotiated with them in 2020, finally withdrawing from Afghanistan and handing the country over to the Taliban in 2021. 

From these examples, the core of American pragmatism is clear: it is based on self-interest, framing friendships according to its needs. The price of lifting sanctions is strategic alignment; sanctions and their lifting are used as tools of pressure and bargaining, not as moral rewards.

The White House has clarified its position regarding lifting sanctions by focusing on how the Syrian government can implement some pressing issues—particularly regional normalization efforts and combating terrorist groups such as ISIS and Palestinian factions threatening Israel. Will it succeed? What challenges face the transitional government in Syria?

There is a structural deficiency within the transitional government; its supporters, leaders, and members of its military institutions hold anti-Israel views and oppose normalization. If Ahmad al-Shara seeks normalization, he needs strong protection from the U.S. The popular sentiment supports the Palestinian cause as a sacred principle. 

Furthermore, Iran has factions, and possibly Turkey itself, interfering in the transitional government and forming a political weight within it. Turkey has factions loyal to it that have recently taken some positions in the transitional government. There are also many elements loyal to ISIS, adopting its jihadist ideology, and displaying its flags. 

Israel periodically tracks locations of leaders from Palestinian armed factions such as the Popular Front and the General Command or Islamic Jihad. Some of these factions are linked organizationally to Iran. The transitional government has yet to gain full legitimacy or recognition. On the other side, there are the Syrian Democratic Forces, the Autonomous Administration in northeastern Syria, and the Kurdish delegation formed after the Kurdish parties’ unity conference in Qamishli. These entities have not yet moved seriously towards internal dialogue with the transitional government, amidst significant social division and the ongoing debate between minority and majority. 

This leads us to conclude that the current transitional government lacks a clear vision and is at risk of collapse at any moment, especially with ISIS preparing for a major assault on main urban centers—reminding us of their attack on Baghdad after seizing Mosul in 2014. 

There is a real opportunity for Syria, as expressed by U.S. envoy Thomas Braak, but complex balances of power exist. The transitional government alone does not hold the key; it must bolster internal cohesion and advance internal dialogue with all components of Syria, away from divisive rhetoric of minority versus majority.

There is a strong American desire to push this transitional government towards legitimacy, review the classification of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, and assess the status of Syria as a state sponsor of terrorism. Trump’s Secretary of State, Marco Rubio, has been tasked with reviewing the Caesar Act. This aligns with U.S. policies related to normalization with Israel, countering foreign terrorists, relocating Palestinian groups, preventing ISIS return, and controlling detention centers in northeastern Syria.

Reber Haboon