One of the main criticisms directed at Öcalan by the majority of the Kurdish people, especially prior to the speech, is his adoption of the idea of "democratic nation" as a substitute for traditional Kurdish nationalism. According to this perspective, Kurds should not seek a nation-state of their own, but rather a decentralized democratic system based on pluralism and participation in the countries they inhabit.

This idea faces opposition from various factions within the Kurdish movement. Kurdish nationalists argue that Öcalan dilutes the Kurdish cause and makes unwarranted concessions to the Turkish state by eliminating the national character of Kurdish demands and transforming them into a general democratic issue within Turkey. Other Kurdish parties, such as the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (YNK), view the speech as a positive step toward peace, supported by several European countries, the United States, and the United Nations. However, some Kurdish factions may consider that this perspective serves the Turkish state more than it serves the Kurds, as it institutionalizes the idea that Kurds must integrate into the countries they live in without demanding independent national rights.

Opponents within the PKK itself, such as some military leaders, may see this speech as an attempt to weaken the Kurdish armed movement without providing real guarantees from the Turkish state. Therefore, the process of laying down arms will likely take a long time of dialogues and agreements.

Future scenarios stemming from this call could lead to several possibilities, some of which are positive and others pose risks to the Kurdish move

First Scenario:
A Prelude to New Political Dialogue Between Turkey and the Kurds  
If Turkey responds to this call with tangible actions, such as reducing repression, enacting legal reforms for the Kurds, and opening political channels for dialogue, it could mark the beginning of a new phase that solidifies the political and cultural rights of Kurds within Turkey. However, this scenario seems unlikely under Erdoğan's government, which is allied with hardline nationalists.

Second Scenario: 
Exploiting the Speech to Eliminate the Kurdish Movement Without Concessions  
There is a possibility that this speech is part of the Turkish state's strategy to weaken the Kurds by creating divisions within the PKK between supporters and opponents of the party's dissolution. In this case, Ankara may use the speech as a means to undermine Kurdish resistance without acknowledging national rights.

Third Scenario: 
Failure of the Call and Continuation of Conflict  
If the speech does not gain support within the Kurdish street or from the PKK, it may lead to a new wave of military confrontation rather than de-escalation, as some may perceive that the Turkish state is trying to deceive the Kurdish movement again.

It is difficult to imagine that Turkey would amend its constitution to officially recognize Kurds as an independent nationality, especially given the current system's reliance on strict Turkish nationalist ideology. Even during periods of peace talks, the Turkish state has not gone beyond offering some superficial reforms, such as allowing certain Kurdish media outlets and lifting some restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language, but without any clear constitutional recognition of Kurds. If there is any constitutional amendment in the future, it is likely to be within a framework that permits limited administrative decentralization, rather than explicit national recognition. The prospect of granting Kurds self-rule similar to the Kurdistan Region of Iraq is entirely out of the question under the current Turkish regime.

The speech raises many questions rather than providing answers regarding its implications for the Kurdish and Turkish political landscape. It is evident that the speech has garnered significant international and regional attention, receiving positive reception in major political circles, including the United States and some European countries, in addition to the support of the United Nations, which views any peace initiative as a necessary step toward stabilizing the region.

The open question remains:  
Is Turkey actually changing, or will the "conditional peace" game be replayed? Particularly as Erdoğan's ambitions become clearer—not only to resolve the Turkish Kurdish issue within Turkey but also towards neighboring countries, with attempts to demand the dismantling of Kurdish military forces in Syria and Iraq that adhere to the ideology of a democratic nation, using it as a pretext for continued intervention in those countries' affairs.

And the bigger question:  
Will the Turkish state respond positively to this call, or will it exploit it as a tool to eliminate the Kurdish issue? Is this initiative presented as part of a genuine solution, or is it merely another political maneuver to beautify Turkey's image before the international community? Especially as it struggles with the beginnings of near-international isolation, at least regionally, from Russia, which no longer sees it as a major state, and from Iran, Arab nations, and some Islamic countries, each of which has suffered some form of betrayal from Erdoğan.

If Turkey is serious about finding a real solution to the Kurdish issue, the first and fundamental step must be to release Abdullah Öcalan, allowing him to express his position freely, without any