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Federalism and Political Decentralization in Syria: Boundaries That Must Not Be Crossed
Although I always write with an optimistic tone, this has never been a sentimental luxury but a deliberate attempt to boost the Kurdish movement’s confidence in itself, so it does not relinquish its most important project: the federal, decentralized system. Maintaining a cohesive and aware Kurdish street is the last fortress against efforts to dilute and dismantle.
However, there are genuine concerns about the extent of regional pressures on major international powers, and the reality is that their lobbies here in America operate in a suspicious, sometimes incomprehensible manner—seemingly forging a silent alliance aimed primarily at floating Joulani’s government, obscuring his terrorist past, and thus sabotaging any mature Kurdish political project in Syria through the rejection of the decentralized system.
Despite these challenges, I still see that Syria is gradually heading—albeit slowly—toward federalism, and possibly toward a genuine transformation of its political system itself. Therefore, it is crucial to never relinquish the principle of federalism and decentralization, as it is not merely an administrative formula but a guarantee of fair representation and the rights of peoples, as well as a condition for continued international support for our cause.
I also believe that some regional states, especially Turkey and Qatar, and notably Saudi Arabia, which is surprisingly involved, are exerting pressure on the United States today to abandon “QSD.” However, the real goal is not QSD as an organization but the Kurdish issue as a whole. After sidelining QSD, they will shamelessly declare to the world that they have “resolved” the Kurdish question simply by opening a few schools in Qamishli and Hasakah!
Nevertheless, I remain convinced that QSD will persist and that the region will move toward federalism—even if under a different name—because what has been achieved on the ground is too significant to be erased by pressure or temporary agreements. This trend gained momentum after Russia returned to the scene with an unexpected visit by the Syrian transitional government’s foreign minister to Moscow, orchestrated by Turkey, with a silent American stance and Israeli approval.
Therefore, it is essential for Kurdish parties in Western Kurdistan, especially those who participated in the Qamishlo conference, to prepare seriously and coordinately for future dialogues with the Syrian transitional government. The absence of the Kurdish National Council from the forefront is a matter of concern—blame lies with both the Autonomous Administration forces, who sought to dominate the entire political arena without partnership, and the Council itself, which chose silence. This could be interpreted as an unspoken acceptance, whether due to internal reasons or external pressures, in clandestine negotiations.
This retreat, whatever its reasons, will not pass unnoticed; it will bear heavy repercussions on the political reputation of the Council and the Kurdish street’s trust in it, which later could lead to a decline in influence, role, and possibly in international support for the Kurdish cause overall—especially if this absence is perceived as tacit approval of dropping national demands or accepting options that do not serve the federal project.
I also reject the notion that the Council is secretly bargaining with the Syrian transitional government—as it did previously with Turkey when it was part of the Syrian National Coalition. The real danger today is that the Council might engage in a silent barter, potentially allowing QSD forces to join what is called “the Syrian National Army,” in exchange for later negotiations over Kurdish rights.
This scenario will inevitably lead to further collapse, as any return of the Council through this route will be met with deaf ears by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leaders, who see the Kurds as only a secondary file to be closed under banners of “one homeland” and “Islamic nation”—just as Khomeini did when he suppressed the Kurdish movement in East Kurdistan under similar slogans.
Thus, any bargaining over QSD—particularly from its leadership or the Autonomous Administration forces—or over the federal project by the Kurdish National Council or the body emerging from the Qamishlo conference or the Autonomous Administration’s representation, would mean dismantling the last political and military stronghold of the Kurds—and pave the way for repeating historical failures that our people have paid dearly for.
Dr. Mahmoud Abbas
