Calmly, and without exaggerations or pre-emptive accusations, let’s review the outcomes of the de facto authority that has been ruling Syria for the past eight months.  
This is not about taking a political stance, but about clearly setting the record straight in a critical moment that cannot tolerate superficiality or denial.

The reality is that Syria, after the fall of the previous regime, entered a new phase described as "transitional."  
However, over time, beyond the rhetoric, accumulating indicators began to emerge that cannot be ignored:  
Security disintegration, political deadlock, economic collapse, deepening social division, and an almost complete loss of sovereignty.

This is not about expectations or intentions but about actual results.  
Therefore, a direct question must be posed:  
Are we being led by this authority toward building a state? Or toward reproducing a crisis, perhaps even a larger explosion?

The system that has been governing our country since the fall of Bashar al-Assad has failed completely in performing any of the functions of the state.  
It is not just an error in some policies; it has failed in nearly everything: security, politics, economy, justice, sovereignty, representation, and administration.

Despite desperate attempts at whitewashing, reality persists:  
The current authority is not managing a transitional phase; it is reinvigorating tyranny with different tools, and Syria is not heading toward stability but toward a brutal disintegration—managed under the guise of "control," while internally it is unraveling.

In the past nine months, the authority was given a rare historical opportunity:  
Complete political vacuum after the fall of the regime, media and financial support from regional allies, absence of any officially recognized alternative internationally, and a desperate popular exhaustion demanding the minimum security and stability.  
Yet, this system failed to produce even a semblance of a state… neither in form nor in substance.

Security and societal failures are not limited to a lack of control; they extend to adopting a dangerous strategy in managing society: inciting Syrians against one another by fueling sectarian, tribal, and regional divisions, and reviving the logic of "tribal protective groups" as a political weapon.

In nearly every region, the state has shifted from a guarantor of cohesion to a player within division.  
Instead of de-escalating local conflicts, the authority quietly fuels them, sometimes with direct signals, based on one principle: whenever people fight, political demands retreat, and the need for “protection” advances.

In the coast, widespread sectarian revenge operations were carried out, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of civilians, accompanied by campaigns of displacement from entire villages, with media neglect, field collusion, and no accountability.

In Sweida, terrible massacres occurred by all standards:  
A coordinated attack involving factions from the "New Army" alongside armed Bedouin from neighboring areas, using heavy weapons, which resulted in the complete destruction of neighborhoods and villages, with hundreds of civilian casualties, including children, women, and elders, and mass executions of entire families.  
Bodies were left in the streets, communications cut off, and no serious investigations have been opened to this day.

What happened in Sweida is not just a "violent event" but a deep national wound.  
An entire province, with historical symbolic significance in the Syrian fabric, was crushed, its residents terrified, their collective dignity insulted, in broad daylight, under the banners of an army that is supposed to represent the state.  
And more dangerously, Israel was present, through air strikes, surveillance, and political interference—cementing the image of the south as an area subject to supra-Syrian understandings, not a national authority.

What happened there created a huge social rift, a loss of trust, and a pain that cannot be contained with statements or "apologies."  
This was not a mistake of estimation but a direct extension of a pattern of authority seeing every Syrian component that doesn’t resemble it as a dangerous project to be either suppressed by force or dismembered from within.

Politically, the authority did not initiate any serious national dialogue and refused to involve any independent civil or revolutionary forces.  
It treated political components as "obstacles," not partners, monopolized the decision-making sovereignty and constitutional authority, while issuing superficial declarations that lack genuine content or achievable mechanisms.

As for the draft constitution, it remained merely an postponed promise, while today the authority rules through an absolute, disguised personal rule, cloaked in religious or "transitional" rhetoric, without genuine representation or a unifying political contract.

Economically, there is no plan, no management, and no acknowledgment of the crisis’s scale:  
Scandals involving the head of the system and his brothers stealing billions, empty promises of forthcoming investments that collapsed at the first test.  
The currency deteriorates, salaries last only days, electricity is nonexistent, water is cut off, medicine is unavailable.

Shady Al-Khash