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The Khayat Empire in Syria: From Financing Allegations to Control of Key Infrastructure
الأخوين الخياط

In January 2020, Deutsche Bank’s Financial Crime Unit—at a time when Doha Bank was one of its clients—was asked to review reports alleging that Doha Bank had processed payments to “Jabhat al-Nusra” on behalf of businessmen Mutaz and Ramzi Khayyat. The investigative memo, dated 14 January, said it had “not identified any information to substantiate the allegations.” It nevertheless suggested, as an “analytical conclusion,” that the accusations might be part of a political campaign by countries that had imposed a blockade on Qatar. The memo also acknowledged that the brothers and the bank had links to Qatar’s ruling family.

Months earlier, in the summer of 2019, eight Syrian refugees had appeared before London’s High Court, accusing the Qatari-Syrian brothers of financing “Jabhat al-Nusra,” which they said had displaced them from their homes. The case was closed six years later without the court ruling on the substance of the allegations. In the meantime, the founder of “Jabhat al-Nusra” entered Damascus and became Syria’s president, while the brothers became among the largest foreign investors in the country of their birth.

This investigation traces the path of Ramzi and Mutaz Khayyat, from allegations raised in court to the influence their companies and business partners have gained across broad sections of Syria’s infrastructure. Those sectors include electricity, airports, banking, oil and real estate, as well as historic houses in Old Damascus—and, ultimately, the Syrian sovereign wealth fund. Their influence expanded in less than two years after the fall of the Assad regime, through concessions said to extend beyond the transitional period.

The investigation is part of the “Deutsche Bank Files,” a year-long cross-border investigative project led by South Africa’s Barracuda, with technical support from Germany’s Data and Research Center (DARC), and involving more than 230 journalists from over 50 media outlets, including Daraj. The leaked documents were obtained by Indian journalist and author Josy Joseph and South African investigative journalist Khadija Sharife.

The investigation draws on the Deutsche Bank files, published British and US court rulings, official records in Qatar and Syria, media coverage, and field reporting in Old Damascus.

 Allegations in court and a bank memo

On 30 July 2019, eight Syrian refugees in the Netherlands filed a case before London’s High Court against Doha Bank and Mutaz and Ramzi Khayyat. The claimants said they had lost their homes and businesses and had been forced to leave Syria because of “Jabhat al-Nusra.” They accused the brothers of receiving weekly transfers worth more than $8.3 million into their personal accounts at the bank. According to the claimants, the sources of the funds included the office of Qatar’s emir.

According to the court filing, the money was transferred to accounts at Turkish banks, then withdrawn in cash or by cheque in Lebanon, before being handed over near the Turkish border to a person said to have used it to buy weapons and ammunition for armed groups in Syria. On 17 June 2020, a second case was filed on behalf of 330 Syrians against the bank and the brothers, based on similar allegations.

The accusations later reached compliance departments in the international banking sector. One Deutsche Bank document reviewed by this investigation shows that the bank’s Financial Crime Unit requested an assessment of reports that Doha Bank had processed payments allegedly sent to “Jabhat al-Nusra” on the brothers’ behalf.

According to the memo dated 14 January 2020, the unit found no information substantiating the allegations. It suggested that they might be connected to a political campaign by countries that had blockaded Qatar, while also recording links between the bank and the brothers, on the one hand, and Qatar’s ruling family, on the other.

The memo also considered the possibility that the lawsuits were indirectly connected to the brothers’ alleged transfers of money to charities that later paid smugglers. It noted that charities in some areas might be compelled to deal with armed groups, raising the possibility that funds could reach groups such as “Jabhat al-Nusra.” However, it said it had found no conclusive evidence that this had happened.

In response to specific questions from Daraj about the Khayyat brothers, Deutsche Bank declined to comment on its relationship with them. It said it did not discuss its relationships with current, former or prospective clients. The bank added that its procedures included risk-based due diligence, screening and ongoing monitoring, with enhanced measures where necessary; that it reviewed allegations of financial crime where applicable and referred matters to an independent regulator; and that its correspondent banking services included enhanced due diligence and controls designed to identify and address suspicious or prohibited payments.

Withdrawals and testimony about intimidation

In November 2020, four of the eight claimants withdrew from the London case. Their lawyer, Ben Emmerson, told the court that his clients had faced harassment, intimidation, pressure and covert surveillance, as well as nighttime visits by what he described as “masked, armed men.”

According to a ruling issued in February 2025, the reported intimidation extended beyond the claimants to witnesses, an interpreter and a journalist. One person was allegedly threatened and offered a bribe; another was threatened with death and had his home broken into. The ruling also referred to bribes being offered to an interpreter, followed by gunfire at his restaurant, and to a journalist being forced to sign an undertaking not to testify. The claimants who withdrew said, according to the ruling, that “fear for their safety” was the sole reason for doing so.

The London Metropolitan Police’s Counter Terrorism Command (SO-15) was informed of the reported intimidation in 2020. In February 2021, it said it had “information and evidence supporting” an allegation of conspiracy to pervert the course of justice. However, it declined to open a full investigation, citing the fact that the alleged conduct had taken place outside Britain and that investigating it would be a “disproportionate use” of its resources.

In 2021, the judge rejected the bank’s application to exclude the intimidation evidence, finding it directly relevant to whether Qatar was an appropriate forum for the case. At the same time, the judge refused to question the brothers about their written statement denying the allegations. At a hearing in November 2024, the claimants’ lawyer, Max Hill, said the case had suffered “irreparable damage” because of a “criminal conspiracy” carried out by people he alleged were acting for the state of Qatar or the defendants.

A February 2025 ruling disclosed that negotiations had taken place to settle the case outside court. They were initially handled by Luis Moreno Ocampo, the former chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The founder of the fund that financed the claim said he understood the ultimate party to be the state of Qatar, while the court described the discussions as settlement negotiations with a party believed to be Qatar. According to the ruling, Ocampo’s efforts led to a proposed figure of $40 million to settle the London cases alone, before a “new intermediary from the royal family” took over.

In a separate case, businessman Basel Hashweh alleged in 2022 before London’s Commercial Court that hundreds of millions of dollars had reached “Jabhat al-Nusra” through inflated contracts awarded to the Khayyats by an engineering office affiliated with the Amiri Diwan, and that the money had passed through Doha Bank and Qatar National Bank. The claim was dismissed on the grounds that accusing a state of sponsoring terrorism constituted a sovereign act protected by immunity. The court did not examine the truth of the allegations.

On 1 July 2024, the judge struck out the claims brought by the four remaining claimants, finding that they amounted to an “abuse of process.” In February 2025, the claimants were ordered to make interim payments of £1.3 million toward the bank’s costs. The case brought on behalf of 330 Syrians was struck out on 18 December 2025 because its claimants had not provided further particulars since filing it. That was a procedural ruling and did not address the substance of the allegations.

The Khayyat brothers deny the accusations and describe them as “bizarre and baseless.” The bank’s lawyers have called them “politically motivated,” saying they were not proven. But the brothers’ rise as investors in Syria after Ahmed al-Sharaa came to power has brought the questions back into focus.

 A new case in the United States

On 27 September 2026, 18 people described in the complaint as US citizens or nationals filed a civil lawsuit in the US District Court for the Southern District of California against Mutaz and Ramzi Khayyat and their company, UrbaCon. The plaintiffs invoked the US Anti-Terrorism Act and its amendments under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, or JASTA.

The complaint alleges that the defendants “aided and abetted, and conspired” with al-Qaeda in Iraq, “Jabhat al-Nusra” and ISIS, at least between 2011 and 2015. It further claims that these groups kidnapped, killed or injured the plaintiffs, or harmed members of their families, in Syria between 2013 and 2015. The brothers are accused of supplying the groups with various kinds of weapons and tens of millions of dollars in cash.

The complaint alleges that UrbaCon’s contracts included inflated costs, generating surplus funds that the defendants could transfer to Syria. It also claims that the brothers entrusted agents in Lebanon and Turkey with delivering money and weapons, and helped arrange what the complaint calls sham negotiations and payments from Qatar to leaders of “Jabhat al-Nusra” and ISIS in exchange for the release of hostages.

The complaint cites testimony attributed to a Lebanese man named Radwan Khroub. He allegedly said that in October 2013 he drove Ramzi Khayyat from Beirut across the Syrian border, carrying 25 bundles of cash, each containing $10,000—a total of $250,000. The money, the complaint says, was to be delivered to a member of “Jabhat al-Nusra” known as “Abu Ubaida” and to the group’s commander Abu Malik al-Talli.

The filing states that a Lebanese military court sentenced Khroub to death in absentia in late 2018 on charges of planning and carrying out terrorist acts. The complaint argues that the brothers’ subsequent success in securing major projects in Syria under al-Sharaa’s government demonstrates a long-standing and decisive relationship with the leadership of “Jabhat al-Nusra.” The court has not ruled on any of these claims. As of the investigation’s publication, the public docket did not show that the defendants had been served or had filed a response.

Allegations in a Florida dispute

The California lawsuit was also cited in a separate dispute before a federal court in Florida. The case pits the company X Strategies against Derek Utley, its co-founder and former chairman. In a filing dated 9 November 2026, Utley said that his co-founder, Alex Bruesewitz, had told him he did not personally pay for his honeymoon stay, and that “two Syrian billionaires” had covered the cost.

Utley added, based on what he said was his “information and belief,” that Mutaz Khayyat was one of them and had provided Bruesewitz with a complimentary stay, including access to an exceptionally expensive hotel suite that typically costs around $15,000 per night.

The filing says the stay was at the Waldorf Astoria Maldives Ithaafushi, which was developed by a company controlled by the Khayyat family and built by their Qatar-based construction company, UCC Holding. It also linked the benefits to Bruesewitz’s relationships with foreign business interests allegedly seeking to use his political and commercial connections.

The company asked the court to strike those passages, describing as “defamatory and false” any implication that Bruesewitz had received benefits in exchange for access to government officials, or that his honeymoon had a connection to terrorism. It denied that any such exchange had taken place. The court had not ruled on the request by the time the investigation was published.

From Damascus contracting to economic influence in Qatar

The family’s business roots lie in Damascus, where their father, Muhammad Raslan Khayyat, founded Khayyat Contracting and Trading in 1983. Around five years before the Syrian uprising, the company was building palaces in Syria for Qatar’s ruling family in partnership with the state-owned Qatar Diar. The family’s ties to Doha, therefore, predated the brothers’ move there.

When the uprising began in the first quarter of 2011, the family moved its headquarters to Doha. There, Mutaz, born in 1983, and his brother Ramzi established Power International Holding (PIH) and its construction arm, UrbaCon, later known as UCC Holding. Within a few years, the group was involved in building some of Doha’s most prominent landmarks, including Mall of Qatar, Lusail City and several World Cup stadiums.

The family’s biggest turning point came with Qatar’s blockade in 2017. At the time, their company Baladna transported thousands of cows from the United States and Europe by air and sea to secure milk and dairy products for the Qatari market. The move made the brothers more than successful contractors: they became part of Qatar’s food-security system. Saba al-Fadala, Baladna’s public relations and communications director, said the company held around 95 per cent of Qatar’s fresh-milk market in 2019.

Baladna was listed on the Qatar Stock Exchange in December 2019, followed by Estithmar Holding in 2022. Ramzi owns 19.82 per cent of Estithmar, while Mutaz owns 19.38 per cent. Mutaz chairs the boards of PIH and UCC, while Ramzi runs them as an executive. Bloomberg estimates the brothers’ combined wealth at more than $7 billion. Their younger brother, Mohammad, features in this investigation as an important link in the family’s activity in Damascus and Washington.

The family’s investments in Qatar do not appear to be entirely private. Sheikh Suhaim bin Abdulaziz Al Thani, a member of Qatar’s ruling family, sits on the board of Estithmar Holding. At Baladna, the state-owned Hassad Food Company and the military and civilian pension funds hold special shares, and each has a representative on the board. The investigation presents these links as evidence of a formal network surrounding the family’s investments.

 Mohammad Hamsho: a family connection and a settlement

The brothers’ story is also connected to their mother, Sumaya Hamsho, the sister of businessman Mohammad Hamsho, one of the most prominent businessmen linked to the Assad regime. Hamsho was born in Damascus in 1966 and founded the Hamsho International Group in 1989. He later held positions in the Damascus Chamber of Commerce and the Federation of Syrian Chambers of Commerce, and became a member of parliament. But in October 2024, less than two months before the regime fell, parliament unanimously stripped him of his seat after it emerged that he held Turkish citizenship, in violation of the constitution’s prohibition on MPs holding a second nationality.

The US Treasury imposed sanctions on Hamsho in August 2011, describing him as a front for Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother and the commander of the Fourth Division. Many Syrians also call him the “godfather of looting.” Years before the regime’s fall, his name was linked to the plunder of property in cities retaken by government forces. Iron salvaged from doors, windows and collapsed roofs was reportedly sold exclusively to his group. A report submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights identified his company Hadid as a major partner of the Fourth Division in this looting. Activists are also preparing a lawsuit accusing him of involvement in the Fourth Division’s Golan arms factories.

After the regime fell, Syrians called for Hamsho to be held accountable. In mid-January 2025, Daraj saw him at his home in the al-Malki neighbourhood, under the protection of private guards and members of Syria’s General Security. That same month, members of the Khayyat family met al-Sharaa in Damascus, according to The New York Times.

On 6 January 2026, Hamsho announced on Facebook that he had signed a “comprehensive agreement” with the government and thanked al-Sharaa. The following day, the National Commission for Combating Illicit Gain announced that Hamsho had reached an “official settlement” under a voluntary disclosure programme, without revealing its value. Reuters reported that he had surrendered around 80 per cent of his business assets, worth more than $640 million.

Agence France-Presse reported that Hamsho’s rehabilitation had been facilitated through Qatari mediation via relatives. Despite the circulation of this account, however, no official Syrian or Qatari source has confirmed that role.

The settlement did not end public anger. Protests followed, including a demonstration outside Hamsho’s villa demanding his prosecution, alongside calls to boycott his companies. The government issued no clear public response to the protests, apart from summoning him in connection with a Cybercrime Court case involving an allegation that he had threatened an activist with death. When asked about Hamsho in New York on 22 September 2026, al-Sharaa said the financial settlement did not exempt him from prosecution in other criminal cases, and that around 80 per cent of his assets had already been taken.

The investigation found no source proving that Hamsho’s companies had joined the Khayyats’ projects or that his assets had been transferred directly to them. But the parallel trajectories raise questions about Qatar’s role and influence.

 From Damascus to Washington: contracts and the repeal of Caesar sanctions

When Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham entered Damascus, investors faced two major obstacles: sanctions imposed under the Caesar Act and the new authorities’ designation as a terrorist organisation. The Caesar Act did not merely restrict dealings with Syria; it also imposed sanctions on those providing construction and engineering services to the Assad government—core areas of business for the Khayyat companies. According to The New York Times, the family needed the sanctions lifted permanently because banks and investors would not commit capital while there remained a risk they could return. The family therefore worked on two tracks, according to the investigation: securing contracts in Damascus and removing barriers to carrying them out in Washington.

In January 2025, Ramzi and Mutaz attended Donald Trump’s inauguration and a “candlelight dinner.” They met Jared Kushner’s parents, Michael Boulos—the husband of Tiffany Trump—and his father, Massad Boulos. That same month, members of the family travelled to Damascus to meet al-Sharaa, carrying a message that they were ready to move quickly.

Contracts began to emerge in May 2025. On 29 May, the Ministry of Energy signed a memorandum of understanding worth approximately $7 billion inside the presidential palace, in the presence of al-Sharaa and US envoy Tom Barrack. The consortium was led by UCC and included Turkish companies Kalyon and Cengiz, as well as Power International USA. The memorandum provided for four gas-fired power stations with a combined capacity of around 4,000 megawatts, as well as solar plants with a capacity of 1,000 megawatts.

On 3 July that year, Baladna’s board approved an integrated industrial project in Syria worth more than $250 million. It included dairy and juice factories, packaging facilities and water-treatment plants.

The plans then turned to air transport. On 6 August 2025, the Civil Aviation Authority, again in Barrack’s presence, signed a memorandum of understanding with Mutaz Khayyat to develop Damascus International Airport. The project was valued at more than $4 billion and would operate under a build-operate-transfer model.

At the same time, Mohammad Khayyat took on part of the family’s efforts in Washington, working with his friend Tarek Namo, a Syrian-American businessman who handled much of the outreach to Congress, according to The New York Times. In the summer of 2025, investors, including Mohammad, presented Republican Congressman Joe Wilson with a proposal for a project on the Syrian coast near Latakia. It included a cruise-ship port, a polo club, a Bugatti showroom and a golf course. Wilson suggested naming the course after Trump to attract the president’s attention. Mohammad later said that a Trump-branded resort had been part of the idea.

On 9 October 2025, Destremart/Gulf Med Supply, a company affiliated with the Dishli Holding Group chaired by Mohammad, became the exclusive distributor and representative for US company SC Johnson’s products in Syria. It was the family’s first publicly announced US commercial agency in the Syrian market, two months before the Caesar Act was repealed.

On 6 November 2025, Ramzi Khayyat and Energy Minister Mohammad al-Bashir signed final concession contracts for eight power stations with a combined capacity of 5,000 megawatts. The package included four gas-fired plants in northern Aleppo, Deir ez-Zor, al-Zayzoun and Muhardeh, and four solar plants. Foundation stones for the solar plants were laid one after another in December, but their values were not disclosed.

On 24 November, Ramzi signed the final concession contracts to develop Damascus Airport, valued at $4 billion and intended to raise its capacity to 31 million passengers a year. Then, on 18 December 2025, Trump signed the National Defense Authorization Act, which included two pages repealing the Caesar Act.

The investigation notes that these contracts were awarded without tenders or publicly announced competitive selection processes. The terms and structure of the agreements also remained unclear, while some concessions were said to extend for long or unspecified periods. By the end of the family’s first year after the regime’s fall, the Khayyats had secured a role in the airport project, the future of electricity generation and part of the wider economy.

 Financing, banking, oil and land

After the repeal of the Caesar Act, the contracts began to turn into active construction projects. Work on building and rehabilitating power stations began in April 2026, and in the middle of that month the company announced that it had completed the first phase of Damascus Airport’s development.

The projects required international financing that had not been available before the sanctions were lifted. In July, Bloomberg reported on a banking effort to arrange a $7 billion loan involving JPMorgan, Qatar National Bank and Abu Dhabi Commercial Bank. The loan would run for five years and be fully guaranteed by Qatar National Bank, with the aim of financing projects led by a Power International Holding consortium.

The group did not limit itself to borrowing from banks; it had also been seeking to acquire stakes in them. On 15 January, Reuters reported that Estithmar Holding was preparing to buy a 60 per cent controlling stake in Al-Shahba Bank and 30 per cent of the International Bank for Islamic Trade and Finance, in what would be the first foreign bank acquisition since the fall of Assad. The Al-Shahba stake was expected to be acquired from Bemo Saudi Fransi Bank and Al-I’timan Al-Ahli Bank.

The proposed controlling stake in Al-Shahba did not ultimately materialise as first announced. On 26 April, Estithmar’s subsidiary, Masarif Holding, signed an agreement to buy 49 per cent of the bank. The deal was completed on 17 September, with a 48.68 per cent stake, alongside plans to open branches in Deir ez-Zor, Hasakah and Qamishli. No agreement to acquire a stake in the International Bank for Islamic Trade and Finance had been announced by the time of the investigation.

The bank has a history that gives the prospective deal added significance. Qatar International Islamic Bank helped establish it in 2007. In 2012, the US Treasury imposed sanctions on the bank, accusing it of serving as a front for the sanctioned Commercial Bank of Syria. Qatar’s representatives resigned from its board at the time. Today, the Qatar Islamic Insurance Company chairs the elected board, “Qatari partners” own 30 per cent of the bank, and Estithmar Holding is preparing to acquire a further 30 per cent. In effect, Qatari interests are returning to the bank through more than one channel after their representatives left under pressure from sanctions.

From banking, the group moved into oil projects. On 17 July in Washington, UCC joined US companies Chevron and TI Capital in a consortium that signed a memorandum with the Syrian Petroleum Company to study reviving the Kirkuk–Baniyas pipeline, which is intended to carry Iraqi oil to the Mediterranean. Reuters cited sources estimating the project’s cost at around $15 billion.

Baladna’s plans, meanwhile, focused on land. On 18 April, it signed an agreement in Washington with the International Finance Corporation. The company described it as an advisory agreement to assess the sector. But on 31 July, it announced a $3.3 billion project on approximately 2,400 square kilometres of state land leased in the Euphrates Basin, in Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor governorates. The area is equivalent to around 1.3 per cent of Syria’s territory. The company also said it was considering buying coastal land, but did not publish the lease terms.

The project drew criticism over the lack of transparency, fears that original landowners could become day labourers on their former land, and uncertainty surrounding land ownership in the Jazira region.

The group also expanded into aviation and telecommunications. It financed the purchase of up to ten Airbus A320 aircraft for Syrian Airlines, for around $250 million, and submitted a bid with Qatar’s Ooredoo for a telecommunications licence. The licence was put out to public tender, unlike the power and airport deals, and was awarded to Kuwait’s Zain Group on 1 July 2026 for a bid of $747 million. The Syrian sovereign wealth fund is expected to retain a quarter of the new company.

The sovereign wealth fund and “New Damascus”

The Syrian sovereign wealth fund is a turning point in the family’s position: it places the Khayyats, according to the investigation, not only among the state’s contractors but within its institutions. On 31 August 2026, Mohammad Khayyat, in his capacity as chief executive of the fund’s real estate development sector, signed an agreement with the UAE-based Arada Group to build “New Damascus” near Mezzeh.

The project covers four million square metres and has an estimated development value of $7 billion. It is planned to include 11,000 housing units, 500 hotel rooms, a 300-bed hospital and schools for 5,000 students. Al-Sharaa received Arada’s chief executive at the People’s Palace, while the company described Mohammad Khayyat as a member of the sovereign fund’s board.

The fund was established by Decree No. 113 of 2025 as an institution linked to the presidency. According to the investigation, little information is publicly available about its activities, funding or membership because its reports are submitted “exclusively to the presidency.” Its assets are estimated at around $50 billion, based on figures attributed to the Ministry of Finance. Among the assets it manages are properties confiscated from businessmen close to the former regime, including Mohammad Hamsho, the brothers’ uncle. Mohammad Khayyat is therefore heading the real estate arm of an institution that manages assets Hamsho surrendered, according to the investigation.

 A partnership in Albania and questions over land

The family’s activity also extends beyond Syria. In Albania, it became a partner in a project by Jared Kushner, the US president’s son-in-law, on Sazan Island and along the Zvërnec coast. Corporate documents reviewed by CBS show that Asos Group, managed by the Khayyat family, is a partner in Sazan Real Estate, the parent company of the entity holding the construction permit. A company spokesperson confirmed the partnership.

According to The New York Times, the family’s role in the project shifted from contractor to partner during the same period in which it was lobbying in Washington to repeal the Caesar Act.

The land connected to the project is, however, the subject of legal questions. Albania Land Development, a company owned by the brothers, purchased land in Zvërnec from businessman Artur Shehu for a reported €122 million—more than 22 times the price agreed five months earlier. Residents say their land was sold without compensation and that their court dispute with Shehu has continued for years. In June 2026, Albania’s Special Anti-Corruption Structure froze funds linked to the company as part of an investigation into suspicions that Shehu had acquired the land using forged documents.

 Old Damascus: property deals away from the spotlight

Away from major project announcements and signing ceremonies, Old Damascus is seeing a quiet but rapid wave of purchases of historic properties, according to the investigation. The New York Times has reported that Ramzi Khayyat is active in acquiring historic houses in the old city with the aim of turning them into tourist destinations.

People familiar with the property market told the investigation that the Khayyats had become a major force in this activity. The family is not new to the sector: the group owns a hospitality arm called Aura, and Ramzi chairs the board of Doha’s Palma Hospitality Group.

Through field visits and interviews with dozens of residents, the Daraj team documented repeated purchases of residential and commercial properties attributed to the family or entities acting on its behalf. These include dilapidated buildings as well as properties in good condition. Residents said the common feature was exceptionally high offers, well above market value and beyond the means of ordinary buyers or conventional local investors.

The properties reviewed range in size from 100 to 1,000 square metres, with reported prices between $300,000 and $3 million. Residents said some deals were completed quickly and in the currency chosen by the seller. In some cases, they said, a buyer completed a purchase without first inspecting the property.

Over time, the acquisitions have extended beyond isolated deals to several areas, including the Jawaniyeh neighbourhood, houses in Sufl al-Talleh and Tale‘ al-Fidda, and the Amin neighbourhood. Evidence gathered by the investigation suggests that some new owners may be commercial fronts for a single powerful entity.

One of the historic properties highlighted by the investigation is Beit Farhi in the Jewish Quarter. It was built by the Farhi family, prominent Ottoman bankers and financial advisers, and is considered the second-largest Jewish palace in Damascus after Maktab Anbar. Syrian architect Hekmat al-Rukbi bought it in the 1990s with the intention of converting it into a boutique hotel. He sold it in 2010 to businessman Ayman Asfari, who continued the restoration work until the uprising began in 2011. The building then remained closed.

Shortly after Bashar al-Assad fled, Asfari opened the Madaniyya Foundation in Damascus. The organisation, launched in Paris, is an alliance of Syrian civil-society organisations intended to help them have a political impact in Syria. After the regime fell, the foundation established its headquarters in Beit Farhi, where it held conferences, cultural and political events, and training workshops.

Local sources said that several meetings had taken place between the Khayyat brothers and Asfari in Damascus neighbourhoods. A source at Madaniyya, who requested anonymity, also told the investigation that there were contracts concerning the transfer of ownership of the house, or its investment rights, to the brothers or one of their companies. Daraj asked Asfari’s office whether such a transfer had taken place and what the contract involved—whether it was a sale or a transfer of investment rights—but had received no response by the time of publication.

Since February 2025, the Jewish Quarter has also seen a new programme for investment contracts covering its houses. The “Absent Jews’ Properties Administration,” formerly under the Palestine Branch of the security services and now part of the Interior Ministry, began issuing agreements under which investors restore houses at their own expense and rent them for a period linked to the restoration costs.

On Straight Street in Bab Touma stands the Agenor Hotel, known to Damascenes as “Beit al-Nimsa’i,” or the Austrian House. It is thought to date to around 1250. A physician from Austria later used it as a residence and as the headquarters of his country’s honorary consulate. It was restored and opened as a hotel in 2010, then closed. A source familiar with the matter said that UrbaCon crews were now working on its restoration under an investment contract whose details remained unclear.

The conversion of historic houses into tourist facilities falls under the Ministry of Tourism, which has been led since 29 March 2025 by Mazen al-Salehani, a businessman who built his career in Qatar. Two months after taking office, he travelled to Doha to discuss investment opportunities in tourism projects with the head of Qatar Tourism. He is also a member of the Supreme Council for Economic Development, chaired by al-Sharaa and linked to the sovereign wealth fund.

Market conditions allow such purchases to take place legally, but that does not remove the concerns they raise. The old city is a strained market: many property owners are absent, land records have been badly damaged, and homes are at risk of collapse. Restoration is expensive and made more difficult by complex procedures and bureaucracy.

In this context, unusually high offers may raise property values across the area and encourage sales. Over time, that could reduce the number of residents, including members of the Christian community, an integral part of the old city’s historic social fabric. The result could be the transformation of inhabited neighbourhoods into investment and tourism enclaves stripped of part of their identity.

 Jobar and reconstruction plans

The questions extend beyond the old city and the Mezzeh area. In Jobar, east of Damascus, around 95 per cent of buildings were destroyed. In September 2026, Human Rights Watch reported that authorities had told residents they could not rebuild, even on their own initiative. It also described a proposed foreign-funded project under which homeowners would receive units half the size of their former homes, agricultural landowners would receive 30 per cent of their land, and tenants would receive nothing.

In March, Damascus Governorate had proposed a project worth around $21 billion to redevelop Jobar, Qaboun and Tishreen. The identities of the investors have not been disclosed. After negotiations, residents’ share rose from 26 to 35 per cent, with the investor retaining 65 per cent. The neighbourhood’s Board of Trustees is seeking a share closer to half.

With no official information about the investors, residents of Jobar have circulated accounts of who may be behind the project. At a meeting of local dignitaries, the head of the neighbourhood’s Popular Leadership said that Jared Kushner was the real partner of some of the companies involved. Kushner is a declared partner of the Khayyat family in Albania. This is consistent with The New York Times’ reporting that the family was involved in several reconstruction proposals and projects in Syria, including rebuilding villages destroyed by war, such as Jobar.